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Introduction
In December 2009, with the global economy inching out of the Great Recession, the sovereign debt crisis hit Europe, soon putting into question the existence of the common currency. Problems to service public debt originated in peripheral Greece but spread to other countries at a pace and vigor that made experts wonder how "a small nation's refinancing difficulties [could] trigger a systemic crisis for the euro that brought global financial markets to the brink?" (Baldwin and Gros (2010) ).
In the search for answers, financial linkages are the immediate and obvious suspects: the strong interdependence between banks and the heavy cross-border exposure to sovereign debt is said to have made sovereign default risk spread across Europe. Specifically, the prospects of a Greek sovereign default adversely affect European banks from the periphery to the core according to their exposure to Greek sovereign debt.
1 By the same token, cross-border interbank lending matter: as a Greek sovereign debt crisis stresses the Greek banking system, counterparty risk rises for foreign creditors, affecting the latter's financial health.
By troubling national banking systems, Greek sovereign risk finally affects sovereign's credit conditions across Europe, since implicit bank guarantees quickly add to sovereign liabilities. Thus, the Economist writes that German officials aim to "protect German banks, many of which hold Greek bonds" and corresponding statements hold for other nations. in Greece and analyze how sovereign default risk of European countries, measured by sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS), responds to these shocks. We relate the responses to the cross-border exposure to Greek sovereign debt and debt of Greek banks, data of which are provided by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).
Our results show that financial linkages significantly contribute to the transmission of sovereign default risk. In particular, bilateral exposure to sovereign debt as well as cross-border bank linkages constitute economically and statistically significant transmission channels. Our preferred specification suggests that a 10 percent increase in the exposure to Greek debt increases the rate of cross-country transmission of sovereign risk by 1.9 percent.
Similarly, a 10 percent increase of exposure to debt of Greek banks implies that sovereign CDS react 0.9 percent stronger to a Greek shock. A back of the envelope calculation based on these numbers shows that financial linkages explain up to two thirds of transmission of sovereign debt in the Euro Crisis.
Methodologically, we build on the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (1989) . In particular, we study the impact of information shocks that are, first, relevant for Greek sovereign risk and, moreover, whose origin can be clearly attributed to Greece itself. These include the release of fiscal data, policy announcements and specifically severe debt downgrades. We make sure that, at these dates, there are no other information shocks to sovereign debt markets so that we can safely assume that all relevant information innovation can be attributed to Greece. 4 Having identified fourteen of these "Greek shocks", we use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to relate the exposure to Greek debt to the rate at which Greek information affects sovereign CDS of a sample of European countries. In doing so, we exploit the time variation in debt exposure and we control for potential other channels such as trade through country fixed effects. We also include a number of financial factors as exogenous variables to control for common shocks.
The advantage of the narrative approach is that identification is achieved without assuming any specific pattern for cross-country spillovers. As noted by Rigobon (2003) , standard identification assumptions, e.g. short-run, long-run or sign restrictions, are dif- 4 Examples of these shocks are: "Greece's central bank governor said the country's budget deficit this year may exceed 12 percent of economic output or four times the EU ceiling." (October 10 th 2009); "Eurozone members commit to provide up to 30bn euros in loans to Greece over the next year." (April 12 th 2010) "Papandreou says Greece has reached a deal with the EU and IMF opening the door to a bailout in return for extra savings of 30 billion euros over three years" (May 5 th 2010).
ficult to defend in the context of cross-country transmission. A possible caveat of our narrative identification arises if on the days of our identified "Greek shocks" there are contemporaneous shocks to other countries, which nevertheless do not appear in the financial headlines. In this case, our estimate of the rate of transmission would be biased as we would erroneously attribute the response to all shocks to the events in Greece. To limit this problem, we take special care in reviewing the financial news and select the financially relevant Greek shocks.
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The narrative approach has been frequently used (see Romer and Romer (1989 , 2010 , Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) , Ramey (2011) for examples in economics and Thorbecke (1997) for finance), but it has also been disputed. Romer and Romer's (1989) original identification strategy through episodes of monetary contraction has been attacked as the effects of the selected events are hardly distinguishable from those of economic fundamentals, which are omitted from the econometric analysis (Hoover and Perez (1995) ). Also, certain scenarios of the economic outlook may have caused the very action of the monetary authority itself, (Leeper (1997) ; see also the reply by Romer and Romer (1997) . 6 We argue that these standard lines of critique based on omitted variables and reverse causality do not apply to our specific setup. First, our selection of Greek events involves a detailed review of financial news and we make sure that no "omitted" news shocks occur on the same day. Other potential omitted variables may operate in the medium-and long-term, thus introducing trends in our CDS data. Since our daily CDS data are dominated by short-lived amplitudes and not by underlying trends, the induced bias is negligible. 7 Similarly, the use of high frequency data releases us of the problem of reverse causality. In particular, a daily blip in the CDS cannot reasonably be believed to cause mayor political action in Greece on the same day (compare Table A1 in the Appendix). Finally, we also argue that our identification is intact even when events are partially anticipated, as we measure the rate of transmission based on the response of other European countries relative to the size of the contemporaneous shock in Greece.
5 A detailed description of the data and the procedure of selection follows in Section 2. 6 Leeper (1997) points out that the events Romer and Romer (1989) use to identify the response to monetary shocks (contractions of the FED) are predictable by past macroeconomic variables and unpredictable changes do not generate responses that look like typical effects of monetary policy. Romer and Romer (1997) argue that the results in Leeper (1997) are due to overfitting. 7 We also refer to the lag structure of the VAR here, which generally captures trends of the dependent data. See the description of our autocorrelation tests in Section 4.
A partial anticipation of future shocks has thus no effect on the estimates of this relative transmission.
The specific mechanism of cross-country contagion and transmission of financial turmoil is at the core of a large empirical and theoretical literature. In a recent survey article, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have introduced a sharp distinction between contagion, which is defined by a fundamental change of cross-market relationship, and plain transmission of country-specific shocks. In that sense, we are much closer to the work of Forbes (2004) and especially Forbes and Chinn (2004) , who do not measure contagion, but the channels of transmission. Contrary to the latter study, our results indicate that bank linkages are an important channel of transmission.
8 Potential reasons for these differences are the relatively strong European financial integration and the large time variation of the cross-border debt structure. Finally, Forbes and Chinn (2004) analyze the role of total bank lending only, which in our study is generally less significant than its components (public and bank-tobank debt).
The unfolding Euro crisis is currently stimulating rich academic output, which can be cover here only partially. A large part of this literature has focussed on the role of financial linkages for the spreading of the crisis. Thus, Bolton and Jeanne (2011) develop a comprehensive theoretical analysis of transmission of sovereign debt through an integrated banking system. The authors point out that, while "diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post." Using sovereign and bank CDS between 2007 and 2010, and a series of bank bailouts, Acharya et al (2011) provide evidence that a weak banking sector increases the default risk of the sovereign, showing, in particular, "that the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads."
Very much in line with these findings, Dieckmann and Plank (2010) find "a private-to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts and the potential burden of government intervention." Focussing on the role of financial news, Bhanot et al (2011) report results that "point to the role of news announcements and the banking channel as important transmission channels in the crisis period." Finally, Arezki et al (2011) find that "sovereign rating downgrades have statistically and economically significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets." The authors discuss several channels of spillover of sovereign risk across countries, pointing especially at "the holding of foreign sovereign debt by domestic banks..." as well as the claims of banks "on banks in other countries" (see also Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2010) and Sy (2010) ).
Our contribution to this empirical literature is twofold. First, building on the documented role of bank-to-bank and bank-to-sovereign linkages as transmission channels of sovereign risk, we take the broader perspective of the country level and analyze crosscountry spillovers and the role the national exposure rates played in the transmission of sovereign risk. Second, we are able to evaluate the transmission mechanism through the careful identification of the financial shocks that originated in Greece and through the time variation in national exposure rates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data in detail Section 3 lays out the empirical framework. Section 4 presents and discusses our main findings and Section 5 concludes.
Data
Our analysis requires a combination of three main data types: (i) a measure of sovereign default risk (ii) a measure of bilateral financial linkages and (iii) a classification of shocks that identifies, in particular, those of Greek origin. The key sources for the first and second type of data are Datastream and the BIS, respectively. We compile the third on our own.
Sovereign default risk. Our measure for a country's default risk is a five-year sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads, collected by CMAN and provided by Bloomberg. A CDS is essentially an insurance contract between two counterparties, typically traded over the counter. It transfers credit risk from one party, the buyer of protection, who pays "a regular fixed premium to the seller of protection in return for compensation contingent on the occurrence of a specified credit event" (Barclays Capital 2010). A credit event, in turn, is a general form of partial or full default by the borrower. In the case of a sovereign CDS the borrower is the sovereign of a country and the underlying debt security is a government bond of a certain specified type and duration. The most frequently traded The figure suggests strong comovements of the countries CDS movements. Indeed, Table   1 reports pairwise correlations of log-changes for the fourteen countries. These pairwise correlations range between 0.6001 (Sweden and Greece) and 0.8915 (Italy and Spain) with an average of 0.7284. Besides the obvious effect of common factors (see Fontana and Scheicher (2010) ) part of that correlation is likely to be generated by spillover effects from one troubled -e.g. Greece -to other countries of the sample. 
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It is important to notice that neither the levels nor the trends in the exposure to Greek debt have not been uniform across all countries. Table 2a shows that within the set of ten European countries, average exposures vary roughly between 0.3 and 2 percent of GDP (for the two years 2009/2010). Table 2b reports summary statistics of the evolution of exposure to Greek debt, following the fourth quarter 2009, for which levels are normalized to 100.
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Panel A reports numbers for total debt by quarter. The last column thus shows that on average the exposure to Greek debt was 62.6% of the initial level, while the country that changed exposure least reduced its exposure by 7.4% (100-92.6) and the severest reduction amounted to 78.8%. Panel B summarizes exposures for Greek public debt. While up to 2010Q4 the average country reduced the corresponding exposure to 67.8% of the initial level, the maximum reduction accounted for 83.6%, while one country actually increased exposure by 5%. Finally, panel C reports the numbers based on Greek bank debt. Between 10 BIS (2006) specifies that balance-sheet relevant instruments include "certificates of deposit (CDs), promissory notes and other negotiable paper issued by non-residents, banks' holdings of international notes and coins, foreign trade-related credits, claims under sale and repurchase agreements with non-residents, deposits and balances placed with banks, loans and advances to banks and non-banks, holdings of securities and participations including equity holdings in unconsolidated banks or non-bank subsidiaries."
11 In principle, the decrease in the exposure to Greek bonds may results from valuation effects. Thus, to grant international comparability, the BIS recommends "that banks' international claims be valued at market prices" but acknowledges that, where "market values are not appropriate, contractual or nominal values should be used." Moreover, differences across countries arise, since "loans in the banking books, which in principle should be assigned nominal value, should be valued in accordance to the reporting countries' accounting standards." (BIS 2006) 12 The beginning of the Greek sovereign debt crisis can be dated to 2009Q4.
2009Q4 and 2010Q4 the average country reduced exposure to 29.7% of the initial level, the maximum reduction accounted for as much as 97.8% and minimum reduction was 3.3% only. Our aim is to exploit these cross-country differences in time variation to extract information about how sovereign risk is transmitted via the exposure to the different classes of Greek debt.
These data are reported on the immediate borrower basis. While these data are quite comprehensive, the accuracy of effective exposure is a potential source of concern. Unfortunately, availability of data on the ultimate risk basis is very limited. Not only would the use of ultimate borrower basis limit our sample, but Greece would drop out of it. A comparison between the data on the immediate and ultimate basis shows, however, that both measures comove very closely.
Greek Shocks. Coming to the third type of required data, we need to compile a list of those days, where financially relevant news are dominated by information from Greece.
For our identification strategy it is essential that we can claim that Greece has been the only origin of a first order shock. Pioneering the "narrative approach," Romer and Romer (1989) stress that potentially severe problems may arise when isolating the shocks due to the judgmental and retrospective nature of the selection process. To reduce the unconscious bias in this selection process, we keep our selection as mechanical as possible. Specifically, we first construct a timeline describing the Euro crisis by merging three sources: Financial Times (Interactive timeline: Greek debt crisis), the Wall Street Journal (Europe's Debt
Crisis -Timeline), and Reuters (Europe's Debt Crisis Timelines). 13 The thus compiled joint timeline covers a period starting with November 5 th 2009 and ending with November 28 th 2010 and includes those days that appear to be relevant to the authors of at least one of these timelines. We mechanically extract the days that contain news from Greece. We then limit the resulting list of days by excluding all those days when financially relevant news are reported from countries other than Greece. In addition, we perform a second round of elimination by a search of potential overlapping shocks originating in other countries based on the Lexis-Nexis database. The final list of events comprises 14 information shocks identified as Greek shocks and is reported in Table A1 , along with a short description of the corresponding event.
Empirical Framework
In this section we discuss our approach to identify sovereign risk spillovers across countries.
We start by considering a n-dimensional vector autoregressive model
where y t is a vector of CDS spreads for each country,
in the lag operator, x t is a m-dimensional vector of exogenous variables which includes the constant and u t is a vector of innovations.
In a more compact form, this model can be written as
where
Following standard practice we assume that the innovations u t reflect relevant countryspecific information which is instantaneously transmitted across markets according to
where ǫ t denotes a vector of independent and identically distributed shocks with zero mean.
The components of ǫ t can thus be interpreted as the unobservable and idiosyncratic, or "structural", shocks to sovereign risk in each respective country. The matrix B, instead, reflects the rate of transmission of these shocks across countries. Without loss of generality, we can normalize the diagonal elements of B to unity by the according choice of units of the shocks.
As part of our identification strategy, we assume that the shock process ǫ t is characterized by a conditional (signed) mean shift that reflects an exceptional event in each country.
Specifically, for each component i we assume
where d i,t is an indicator function that takes three values, -1, 0 and 1, ξ i is a time-invariant parameter and ν i,t is identically and independently distributed across time. This notation shall reflect the distinction between the "normal" shocks ν i,t , which affect each country's sovereign risk in every period and are unobservable, and some "abnormal" events that occur rather infrequently and that to some extent are observable. 14 Applying the same decomposition to each country, we can write
where D t is a diagonal matrix with entries d i,t . Assuming that both normal shocks and the occurrence of abnormal events are i.i.d. across countries and time, we can maintain our previous assumption regarding the time invariance and the homoskedasticity of the structural shocks ǫ t .
Pursuing the "narrative approach" of Romer and Romer (1989) , we are able to identify the dates in which an exceptional events occurs in Greece but in no other country. Formally, this set of dates T gr is
In the following we will refer to the elements of T gr as pure Greek events. On the base of this set of dates, we aim to estimate the response of all other countries to exceptional event in Greece, or equivalently the column of B corresponding to the position of Greece in the vector y t . With this objective in mind, we define the signed indicator function as
so that we can rewrite (3) as
where ξ gr denotes the vector of exceptional shocks in Greek events, and thus is zero except for its Greek component ξ gr , while ξ ngr t ≡ D t|t ∈T gr ξ reflects the random occurrence of exceptional shocks in other countries in all other periods.
14 Despite being quite restrictive, the assumption that the effect of exceptional events is constant over time doesn't affect our results but conveniently reduces notation.
Combining (6) and (2), we can then rewrite our original model (1) as
where β ≡ Bξ gr andũ t is a modified residual defined as
The residualsũ t are conditionally independent of z t and 1 gr,t so that we have now a framework that allows us to estimate consistently the components of vector β, which measure the average response of sovereign risk in each country to a shock in Greece.
In pursuing the approach sketched above, however, we cannot sustain the standard assumption of conditional homoskedasticity in the residuals. By construction, u gr t from (8) depends on the "normal" shocks ν t only, while u ngr t is the sum of ν t and, potentially, the "exceptional" shocks d i,t ξ i t in all countries. Our strategy thus forces us to derive an estimator that allows for the presence of two alternating regimes in the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.
′ we can reformulate model (7) as
which is formally equivalent to (1). Accounting for heteroskedasticity, we assume that
where T gr is the known subset pure Greek events and the two matrices Σ gr and Σ ngr have full rank and are invertible. We refer to the Appendix for the derivation of a generalized least squares (GLS) estimator ofΦ which accounts for this specific type of heteroskedasticity.
In addition to the arising heteroskedasticity we need to deal with another complication of the narrative approach. Specifically, we cannot infer the rate of cross-country transmission of sovereign risk directly from our estimates of β. By construction, indeed, each component β k is a reduced form that depends on the actual rate of transmission from Greece to country k, as measured by the component B (k,gr) , times the average magnitude of Greek events ξ gr .
To obviate this problem, we exploit the linearity of our model and we estimate the rate of transmission by looking at the response of each country k relative to the one of Greece, or β k /β gr . The coefficient β gr equals ξ gr t so that this ratio captures exactly B (k,gr) . We then compute a confidence interval for each of these ratios by bootstrapping the residuals from regression.
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Coming back to our goal of assessing the role of financial linkages in the spreading of the current European sovereign crisis, we recognize that the literature has identified alternative transmission channels, which range from the cross-country linkages of the real economy such as trade relations and technological spillovers to non-fundamental-based linkages. We observe, however, that financial exposure tends to move much faster than real bilateral linkages and its evolution is not directly linked to changes in market sentiments.
We therefore exploit the time variation in order to identify the contribution of financial linkages to the overall transmission of sovereign risk. Specifically, we allow the spillover matrix B in (2) to vary over time and we decompose it into a time-invariant component and a time-varying component, the latter being a function of our measure of financial linkages.
Such a decomposition requires a modification of model (7) where we allow the transmission matrix B q to vary across quarters q. 16 We then assume that the cross-country spillovers are linear in the financial linkages, imposing on B q the following form
where B 0 is a constant matrix capturing the time-invariant channels and the components of L q are our measures of financial linkages, which vary across quarters. In (10) we maintain our previous normalization and we set all diagonal entries of B 0 to one (the diagonal entries of L q are zero by construction). Furthermore, d is a scalar, indicating that financial linkages transmit sovereign risk from one country to another in the same way, i.e. independently of 15 In doing so, we take special care of resampling the residuals only within each variance-covariance regime but not across them to satisfy the assumption of invariance in distribution that underlies the bootstrapping technique.
16 The choice of quarters as the frequency of variation of the transmission matrix B is based on the availability of data for our measure of financial linkages. the country pair.
Our main goal is to estimate the scalar d in (10). To do so, we consider the following specification of the model
where δ 0 ≡ (I + B 0 )ξ gr is a n × 1 vector, δ 1 ≡ d · ξ gr is a scalar and l gr,q is a n × 1 vector of cross-border financial exposures to Greece.
The key parameter d is assumed to be constant across all country pairs, which constitutes a restriction on the estimated coefficients. Technically, this requires to impose a cross-equation restriction on the interaction coefficient appearing in the above specification.
Furthermore, implicit in model (11) is the fact that the residualũ t now depends on B q (see (8)), and thus has a variance-covariance matrix which can vary both across regimes (Greek and non-Greek) and the quarters q. We thus need to derive an estimator that allows us to deal with these properties of the model. 
Thus, ∆ 1 denotes a vector of coefficients on the interaction term l gr,q · 1 gr,t . The equation on the right specifies a set of linear restrictions on each rowΦ (k) of the matrix of coefficientsΦ. Imposing
where e k is the k th unit vector of length n, this model is identical to our specification (11).
The residual process satisfies the following set of assumptions
where T q is the set of dates in quarter q and T gr as defined in (4). This formulation allows the variance-covariance matrix of residuals to depend on the quarter q within the two regimes.
We refer once again to the Appendix for a technical description of the restricted GLS estimator we use to estimate model (12) under the specific type of heteroskedasticity assumed in (13).
We are now ready to perform our estimations. Specifically, in a two-step procedure, we would first estimate (11) by simple OLS, compute the residuals to obtain estimates for the quarter-specific VCV matrices Σ ngr,q and Σ gr,q and then use these matrices to estimate the feasible GLS. The value of d can then be inferred by normalizing the estimate of δ 1
by the average size of Greek events which, by our normalization of B 0 , corresponds to the Greek component of δ 0 . We then construct the confidence interval by repeating the two-step estimation procedure with bootstrapped residuals in order to obtain a synthetic distribution for the estimate of d.
Proceeding on this route, however, we face the difficulty that the quarterly sets of dates with Greek events, T q , contain, on average, less than two elements. Thus, the standard estimate of the quarter-specific variance-covariance matrix
delivers matrices that do not have full rank and cannot be inverted for the calculation of the GLS estimations. We deal with this problem by simply taking the time-average variance-covariance matrix for all quarters.
Results
This section summarizes the results of the generalized least square (GLS) estimations of the transmission of sovereign risk. We begin by estimating model (7) to assess average, time-invariant transmission. We then turn to model (11) to analyze the role of the financial linkages.
Unless explicitly described otherwise, the dependent vector y t consists of five-year sovereign CDS of eleven European countries (including Greece), logged and differentiated.
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We log the data in order not to give excessive weight to the relatively large reactions of 'PIGS' or other troubled countries (compare Figure 1) . Intuitively, a jump of Danish CDS from 30 to 50 basis points should be considered much more dramatic than an increase of Portuguese CDS from 450 to 470 basis points. The vector of independent variablesz t comprises the lags of y t , exogenous variables x t , the Greek dummy and, when estimating model (11), the interaction of the Greek dummy with a measure of financial exposure to Greece. To control for common shocks affecting global market conditions, the vector of exogenous variables consists of the following variables: sovereign CDS of the U.S. and of Japan (logged and differentiated as all other CDS and lagged), the U.S. VIX (logged and lagged), market returns (defined as log changes of the S&P index), the U.S. federal fund rate, and seasonal dummies for each day of the week.
The data are reported on a daily basis, except those of the financial linkages. They span a period of 522 business days for the calender years 2009 ad 2010. 
Baseline Specification -Time Invariant Transmission
In our baseline specification we estimate model (7). The coefficient β is constant over the entire period and thus captures the time-average of the response to the identified Greek shocks by the ten other European countries.
Our tests of autocorrelation of the residuals prompt us to include eight lags of the dependent variable and no lag of the exogenous variables. Moreover, we disregard heteroskedasticity within the set of days where Greek events occur. Table 3a , reports the results for the baseline specification. The columns correspond to the elements of the vector y t , i.e. to the eleven countries. In the upper panel, we report the corresponding coefficients on the indicator for Greek events (GR), along with the standard errors. All of the estimates of the eleven coefficients are positive and the implied t-ratios indicate that most of the coefficients are statistically significant at least on the five percent level. The exceptions are those corresponding to Germany and the Netherlands. The point estimate for Greece itself is 0.0722, which indicates that the events identified in Table A1 generated, on average, a jump in the Greek sovereign CDS of over 7 percent. At a timeaverage of 679 basis points in 2010, this average change of CDS is roughly equivalent to a jump of 49 basis points (679 * .0722 = 49.024).
The coefficients corresponding to countries other than Greece itself vary from 0.0113 (Netherlands) to 0.0310 (Italy). Measured relative to the magnitude of the Greek one (lower panel), these estimates imply a rate of transmission that ranges from 15.6% and 42.9%, with an average for all ten countries equal to 32.0%. 19 These numbers indicate economically important transmission rates. At the same time, the estimated coefficients are strikingly similar in magnitudes. To put this observation into perspective, recall that the CDSs are logged so that the coefficients measure the transmission of Greek shocks in percent of the countries' sovereign CDS. Thus, a one percent increase in the Portuguese CDS corresponds to a jump of 2.9 basis points, while one percent increase in French CDS corresponds to an increase of 0.7 basis points, based on 2010 averages.
Assessing transmission rates in levels, Table 3b 19 Notice that there is a strong relation in the statistical significance of normalized and absolute responses. The only exceptions are Italy and Spain, where we observe a slight loss of significance. We attribute this difference to the use of bootstrap confidence intervals in the case of normalized response.
20 The confidence bounds are derived from a bootstrap distribution based on 1000 replications. 
Impulse response functions of CDS (log-changes) of eleven countries to a Greek shock of average size for the 20 business days after impact (blue line). The red lines indicate the 5% confidence bounds based on bootstrap exercise with 1000 replications.
Financial Linkages
We turn now to the estimation specified in (11) in order to analyze the role of financial linkages in the Euro crisis, exploiting the time-variation of the exposure to Greek debt.
We use three measures for the linkages: the exposure (i) to total Greek debt, (ii) to Greek public debt and (iii) to debt of Greek banks. All measures are normalized by average real GDP of the years 2009 and 2010 and logged. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will refer to these measures as the exposure to Greece. Table 4 reports the estimation results based on model (11). Column I corresponds to the specification that relies on the exposures to Greece defined through Total Greek debt.
The first row of the table reports the coefficients on the Greek dummy (GR), measuring the Greek fixed effect of the average Greek shock. The coefficient is 0.0737, close to the point estimate in our baseline regression (Table 3a ). In our analysis of the role of financial linkages for the transmission of sovereign risk, the coefficient of interest is the one on GR * T otal, i.e. the interaction term between the Greek dummy and the exposure to Greece (l gr,q · 1 gr,t in (11)). This estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the one percent level, as indicated by the implied t-ratios.
To assess the transmission independent of the size of the original shock, the coefficient on GR * T otal needs to be normalized by the average size of the Greek shock. Since we cannot observe the magnitude of the underlying shock, we normalize the coefficient on GR * T otal by the Greek component of the Greek dummy (GR). The resulting ratio measures how the exposure to Greece impacts the transmission rate of sovereign debt.
For brevity, we will refer to this measure as Exposure. The point estimates in Column I result in a value of 0.2809 for Exposure. As discussed in the Section 3, we cannot derive a theoretical distribution for Exposure and resume to bootstrapping to assess statistical significance. The lower part of Table 4 summarizes the bootstrap confidence bounds based on 1000 bootstrap replications, indicating that the one percent confidence interval is on the positive axis. Based on a one percent confidence level, we can thus conclude that the bilateral exposure to Greek debt plays a positive role for the transmission of sovereign risk. The exposure to Greek debt is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant: the value of 0.2809 for Exposure indicates that a one percent reduction in the exposure to Greece decreases a country's CDS response to a Greek shock by almost a third of a percent. Based on a rough calculation, the relative response of sovereign default risk of other European countries due to a Greek shock would have been 28 percent smaller in absence of any financial exposure. We take these indicative results as a motivation to scrutinize the different sub-components of Total Greek debt, i.e. Greek public debt and the debt of Greek banks.
Column II corresponds to the specification where exposure to Greece is defined through Greek public debt. The coefficient on the dummy GR is 0.0737, the one on interaction term GR * P ublic equals 0.0207. The implied t-ratios of both coefficients indicate significance at the 1 percent level. The ratio of the two point estimates in Column I results in a value of 0.189 for Exposure. The lower part of Column II shows that the bootstrap confidence interval for the one-percent confidence level is on the positive axis. In addition, value of Exposure lies well in the middle of these intervals and is close to the mean of the sample of bootstrap replications (mean BStr), reported to be 0.2088. Figure 4 Distribution of the estimated parameter of the rate of response (d in Tables 3-8) , derived from 1000 bootstrap replications. The panels correspond to the financial exposure to Greek public, bank and non-bank private debt.
Column III of Table 4 reports parallel results when exposure to Greece is measured through Bank debt. Again, the coefficient on the interaction term GR * Bank is positive and significant on the one percent level, and the implied value for Exposure is 0.118. The bootstrap confidence bounds indicate that the Exposure is significant at the one percent level. The magnitude of the point estimates suggest that the role of exposure to debt of foreign bank is somewhat less important for the transmission of sovereign debt: the elasticity of the spillover effects to bank debt exposure is measured to be about two thirds of the corresponding elasticity with respect to direct exposure to Greek sovereign debt.
The value of 0.118 for Exposure exposure to debt of Greek banks indicates that a one percent reduction in this exposure decreases a country's CDS response to a Greek shock by almost a 0.12 percent. Again, in a rough calculation, the relative response of sovereign default risk of other European countries due to a Greek shock would have been 12 percent smaller in absence of any financial exposure.
Overall, the baseline estimates suggest that the rates of exposure to Greek sovereign debt and to debt of Greek banks played an important role for the spreading of sovereign risk across the Euro area. Interestingly, our estimate of elasticity regarding total exposure (0.2809) appears to linearly decompose into one third stemming from exposure to Greek banks (0.118) and two thirds stemming from exposure to Greek sovereign debt (0.189). 
Robustness
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we repeat our estimations, measuring CDS in basis points and the exposure to Greek debt in percent of GDP (i.e., we do not log these variables). In this linear specification, the CDS of the European countries is assumed to react to a Greek shock independently of their actual level. An increase of Danish CDS from 30 to 50 basis points is thus treated similar as an increase of Portuguese CDS from 450 to 470. Moreover, an increase of GDP-normalized exposure from 0.01 to 0.02 is assumed to have the same effect as an increase from 0.11 to 0.12 exposure per GDP. This specification therefore puts less weight on the time variation of very lightly exposed countries. Table 5 shows that all signs of the estimates are preserved under this linear specification. However, Column I indicates the coefficient of the interaction term GR * T otal ceases to be significant, which translates into an insignificant relative response Exposure, as the bootstrap confidence bounds show. For the specifications involving Greek
Public debt and debt of Greek banks, however, the estimates are intact and significant on the one percent level. The estimates of the coefficient d are 5.91 and 22.53, respectively.
With these point estimates, based on exposure in percent of GDP, we can give the following absolute interpretation of our results. The value for the relative response of 22.53 suggests that a reduction of exposure to debt of Greek banks of 0.1 percent of GDP (the average exposure is 0.17 percent of GDP) implies that the relative response decreases by almost a quarter (0.01 * 22.5 = 0.225). Just as the estimates with the logged variables, these numbers indicate large transmission rates and a prominent role of financial linkages for the transmission of sovereign debt.
Next, we limit the number of countries in our sample. Specifically, we observe that Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden exhibit exceptionally large changes of the financial linkages for these countries (in percent). To make sure that previous results are not driven by a few of these extreme changes, we replicate our estimations, excluding the three countries from our sample. The results are reported in Table 6 . The estimates of Exposure for the specification with Public and Bank debt with the limited sample are roughly double in magnitude compared to the ones in the full sample (compare Table 4 ), while the high significance levels are preserved. Thus, the numbers suggest that a 100 percent reduction in the exposure to Greece decreases a country's CDS response to a Greek shock by almost half (−1 * 0.48 = −0.48 ). Overall, the qualitative results of our baseline specification seem not to be driven by a small number of countries with the largest time-variation in the exposure of to Greek debt.
As a third robustness check, we exclude Sweden and UK from our sample, which limits the analysis to countries within the Euro zone. We thus include only the countries, which assume implicit liabilities through the ECB balance sheet. A comparison between results of this reduced and the full sample are therefore indicative whether the transmission of sovereign risk operates significantly through ECB assets, in which case the Exposure should be estimated to be larger for the reduced sample. Table 7 shows that the relative response, Exposure, is significant on the one percent level for all specifications. Moreover, for the reduced sample, all three estimates of Exposure are very close to but somewhat lower than those of the full sample (compare Table 4 ) and the respective ten percent confidence intervals overlap widely. These results do not indicate strong transmission channels via the ECB balance sheet.
Finally, we try to capture not only the spillover effects of direct exposure to Greek debt but the entire network of financial linkages across European continent. In particular, if
French banks are strongly exposed to Greek sovereign debt, while Spanish banks are not, the Spanish banks might nevertheless suffer from an increase in Greek sovereign risk due to their indirect exposure through the French banking system. To capture these indirect effects, we invert the matrix of bilateral financial linkages and estimate the corresponding Greek column of the matrix of financial linkages. The exposure now captures the overalli.e., the direct and the indirect -transmission of Greek shocks to the respective European countries. Table 8shows that our estimates are intact, except for the fact that under the specification with Bank Debt, Exposure is now significant on the five percent level only (Column III).
Conclusion
This paper has shown that financial linkages did matter for the transmission of sovereign risk in the Euro crisis. Our estimates show that a 10 percent increase in the exposure to foreign sovereign debt increases the spillover effects of sovereign risk by 1.8 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent increase of exposure to debt of foreign banks, increases these spillover effects by 1.2 percent. These estimates are statistically significant and economically relevant.
Methodologically, we follow the narrative approach by Romer and Romer (1989) , identifying financially relevant news shocks that can be attributed to Greek's problems to service its sovereign debt. These shocks are then used to assess the response of sovereign risk of other European countries. We further relate the latter responses to cross-border financial linkages, controlling for transmission channels that are slow to change through fixed effects.
A The Estimator
We derive the estimator used in main body of the paper. To do so, we will proceed in several steps. First, we state a technical result on matrix inversion, which we use later.
Second, we derive a multi-variate generalized least squares (GLS) estimator under the type of heteroskedasticity described in the main text. Third, we describe our bootstrapping techniques.
A.1 Matrix Algebra
Claim 1 Let Σ k be a collection of n × n matrices with full rank, for k = 1, ..., K. Let further I k denote m × m matrices of the following form: all off-diagonal elements equal to zero, all diagonal elements are either zero or one and the I k sum to the unit matrix:
holds, where ⊗ symbolizes the Kronecker matrix multiplication.
Proof. Multiplication of k Σ k ⊗ I k and the right hand side in (14) and exploiting the basic properties of the Kronecker multiplication yields
A.2 GLS Estimator -Two Regimes of VCV-Matrix
Consider the n-dimensional model
where T gr is the set of greek events and Σ gr and Σ ngr are assumed to be non-singular. Here and in the following, E t denotes the expected value given the information set available at period t.
Further assumptions are required, in particular, to guarantee the asymptotic normality of the GLS estimator. Following Lütkepohl (2007, p. 397), we assume throughout that the residualũ t is a white noise process, the matrixΦ of autoregressive coefficients satisfies a stability condition, and that the vector of exogenous variables x t , which appears among the elements of z t , is generated by a stationary, stable VAR process which is independent of the processũ t .
For a sample size T , model (15) can be written compactly as
where y is the nT × 1 vector obtained by stacking the T -dimensional vectors y 
Under the assumption in (16) and the regularity conditions discussed above, we can show Claim 2 The GLS estimator ofβ converges in distribution according to
is well-defined, symmetric and non-singular and V ≡ (I n ⊗Z)Σ −1
Proof. Rearranging (18) we obtain
Expanding the term within squared brackets yields
where Ω ij denotes the T × T block of Σ gr with (i, j) position. ω ij,ngr is defined analogously. Substituting for Ω ij we obtain
where T gr and T ngr are used to denote the number of Greek and non-Greek events respectively and λ = Tgr T is the sample probability of t ∈ T gr . Assuming that λ converges to a finite number as T → ∞, the assumptions in (16) and the regularity conditions imposed above ensure that eachZΩ ijZ ′ has a well-defined probability limit. We can thus write
where Q is a symmetric matrix (since Σ −1 u is symmetric) and is non-singular. Expanding the second term in (19) we get
The termsz tũj,t are martingale difference sequences with well-defined variance-covariance matrices in both Greek and non-Greek regimes. We can therefore apply a version of the Central Limit Theorem (see Hamilton (1994, p. 193) ) to show that each
j=1Z Ω i,jũ(j) has a well-defined asymptotic normal distribution. Thus, we can write
Combining (20) and (21), we obtain
A.3 GLS Estimator -Time-Dependent VCV-Matrix and Constraints
Consider the following model
Thus, ∆ 1 denotes a vector of coefficients on the interaction term l gr,q · 1 gr,t . The equation on the right specifies a set of linear restrictions on each rowΦ (k) of the matrix of coefficientsΦ. In particular,
where e k is the k th unit vector of length n. This set of constraints restricts the components of vector ∆ 1 to be equal to each other.
where T q is the set of dates in quarter q and T gr as defined in (4) . This formulation allows the variance-covariance matrix of residuals to depend on the quarter q within the two regimes.
Rewriting model (22) using the notation introduced in the previous case, we obtain
′ is the n(p + 1) + n × 1 vector of constrained coefficients obtained from stacking the rowsΦ (k) of matrixΦ, while γ is the n(p + 1) + 1 × 1 vector of unconstrained coefficients and is defined as
The two coefficients are linearly related through the matrix R, which is defined by
where W and E k , for k = 1, . . . , n satisfy
The assumptions (23) on the distribution of the residuals imply that the vector of residualsũ has a variance-covariance matrix that is now equal to 
where 0 Tq×Tq and I Tq×Tq denote a zero matrix and an identity matrix with dimension T q ×T q , respectively.
We now derive an estimator for this model under this set of assumptions. Substituting the constraint into the main equation, the GLS estimator of γ minimizes the expressioñ
The estimator of γ is thuŝ
Under the assumptions in (23) and the same regularity conditions as before, we can show Claim 3 The GLS estimatorγ converges in distribution according to
is well-defined, symmetric and non-
Proof. Rearranging (26) we obtain
The expansion of the term within squared bracket yields 
where Ω ij is used again to indicate the T × T block of matrix Σ u with (i, j) position.
We can further rearrange this equation. To do so, we need first to realize that the matrix Ω ij is now formed by different submatrices which account for the varying covariance of residuals across quarters: Let I gr,q define the non-zero diagonal submatrix with T q ×T q dimension of the matrix I gr T ·I q . Matrix I ngr,q is defined analogously. Applying Claim 1, we write Ω ij,q = ω ij,gr,q · I gr,q + ω ij,ngr,q · I ngr,q , where ω ij,gr,q and ω ij,ngr,q denote the components with (i, j) position of Σ −1 gr,q and Σ −1 ngr,q , respectively.
Using the definitions of Ω ij , W and each E i , we can now show that the blocks of the expanded matrix in (28) contains the uncentered second moments of the regressors inz t and thus must have a well-defined probability limit. Consider a partition of the previously defined matrixZ into a number of submatricesZ q which are formed by the time series of where λ q , T gr,q and T ngr,q are defined as before but now depend on a specific quarter q and n = P (t in quarter q) denotes the sample probability of a date t being in quarter q.
Assuming that the limits for λ q and n as T → ∞ exist and are finite, our set of assumptions ensures that 1 T Z q Ω ij,q Z ′ q converges in probability. We can thus write 1
where Q is a symmetric matrix (since Σ −1 u is symmetric) and is assumed to be non-singular. Using a similar rearrangement, we can also show that 
where E ij is well-defined. Finally, we can show analougsly that
where H is well-defined. Combining these three results, we obtain
where Q is well-defined, symmetric and non-singular.
Given the assumption that the residual u t is conditional independent of the regressors inz t , we can now apply the Central Limit Theorem, as we did in the previous case, and we can show that the second term in (27) has a well-defined asymptotic distribution:
where V ≡ R ′ (I n ⊗Z ′ )Σ −1 u (I n ⊗Z)R. Combining (29) and (30) we obtain √ T (γ − γ) Table 4 
